Ten Questions

As noted earlier, the Governance Working Group of the Anglican Church of Canada has issued a report outlining the legal and canonical implications of the adoption of the proposed Anglican Covenant. The report invites responses to ten questions. Here are the questions along with my responses.

1. Should the imprecision in the definitions of a number of terms used in the Covenant concern General Synod when it considers whether or not to adopt the Covenant?

Imprecision or elasticity of meaning can be a strength in documents such as theological consensus statements and liturgical texts. In these sorts of texts elasticity allows for agreement on wording by a broad cross section of people because of, not in spite of, the imprecision. We can agree to use the same words without having to mean precisely the same thing. But the Covenant is not a consensus document. It is a set of standards, a set of commitments and undertakings, and a process for measuring whether a given Church is fulfilling its commitments in light of those standards.

The GWG report correctly notes that imprecision in the standards makes it impossible for a Church to know precisely what commitments it is making in adopting the Covenant. When a question arises as to whether a given controversial action is compatible or incompatible with the Covenant, elasticity of meaning becomes a serious liability, because without clear criteria for determining compatibility, inevitably any decision rests heavily on the discretion of the decision-making body and risks being criticized as arbitrary. The imprecision in several definitions in the Covenant thus undermines the credibility of any decision that might in future be made pursuant to the Covenant, and introduces risk that protagonists in a dispute may refuse to accept such a decision. The likely outcome is increased conflict rather than conflict resolution.

2. Should the lack of natural justice and procedural fairness in section 4 concern General Synod when it considers whether or not to adopt the Covenant?

The principles of natural justice are fundamental to producing fair outcomes in any judicial or quasi-judicial process. These principles are essential to the administration of justice in both civil and canonical realms. They are rightly guaranteed in Canon XVIII on Discipline. It is essential to ensure that decisions are not only fair, but that they are demonstrably fair by design rather than by good fortune, and seen to be fair. Without guarantees of procedural fairness, the credibility of the dispute-settling process in section 4 is undermined, and there is a real risk that a decision could be reached which is demonstrably arbitrary and unfair. Because all human processes are fallible, the preservation of fairness must depend on the design of the process, and not on the good will of the members of the tribunal. Fairness is a Gospel value, and the Church should set an example to the world in establishing processes that are demonstrably fair. Implementing a process which is demonstrably unfair is contrary to the fourth Mark of Mission (“to seek to transform unjust structures of society.”) Given that this Mark of Mission is itself part of the Covenant (s. 2.2.2.d) the dispute-settling process in section 4.2 is arguably incompatible with the Covenant.

What is worrisome is that it is conceivable that the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding pursuant to Canon XVIII could be submitted to the Standing Committee for review. Thus a process that guarantees natural justice could be subject to review by a process that violates natural justice.

3. If the Covenant were adopted by General Synod, what wording should be included in the resolution by General Synod to ensure clarity about General Synod’s intention about whether the Covenant does or does not affect the doctrine of the Anglican Church of Canada?

The problem suggested by this question is the lack of clarity about the implications of adopting the Covenant, and specifically whether the Covenant affects the doctrine of the Anglican Church of Canada. Elsewhere I have argued that the Covenant's procedures could overrule a doctrinal statement made by the General Synod pursuant to its jurisdiction over the definition of the doctrines of the Anglican Church of Canada (Declaration of Principles s. 6(i)). If that is what is intended by the General Synod in adopting the Covenant, then it would amount to ceding jurisdiction, which point would have to be very clear prior to adoption. If it is not what is intended, the question is whether the General Synod in fact does intend to adopt the Covenant. Although it would be a trivial matter to include a clause in the adopting resolution to the effect that “adoption of the Anglican Covenant shall not be interpreted to affect the doctrine of the Anglican Church of Canada or the General Synod's jurisdiction over doctrine”, the question is whether such a clause would be consistent with adoption of the Covenant. Adding such a proviso to the adoption of the Covenant would amount either to a partial or conditional adoption or to a unilateral amendment of the Covenant, neither of which is contemplated by the Covenant.

4. If the Covenant were adopted by General Synod, what should be the relationship between the Covenant and the Declaration of Principles and the Constitution of the Anglican Church of Canada? What wording should be included in the resolution by General Synod to achieve this?

I believe that the Covenant, if adopted, would be constitutional or quasi-constitutional in effect. That being the case, the resolution to adopt the Covenant should make this clear, most straightforwardly by including reference to the Anglican Covenant in the Declaration of Principles. One way to accomplish this would be to insert a new clause 7(a) stating “the General Synod, and the Provincial and Diocesan Synods in the Anglican Church of Canada shall exercise their authority in their several jurisdictions in accordance with, and subject to the procedures of, the Anglican Covenant.” Section 9(a) would have to be amended as well, inserting “With the exception of section 7(a)” at the beginning. The effect of the first amendment would be to make all Synods in Canada explicitly subject to the terms of the Anglican Covenant. The second amendment would do the same with respect to bishops exercising the (undefined) powers inherent in the office of bishop.

Including the Covenant in the Declaration of Principles is, of course, contrary to the assurances that its adoption does not imply any constitutional change or limitation in autonomy. (Section 4.1.3)

5. What consultation with (or approval by) the Provincial and Diocesan Synods [is required] before General Synod considers a resolution to adopt the Covenant? Beyond any legal requirements, what consultation (or approval) should take place?

If the Covenant is to be included in the Declaration of Principles as suggested above, then it requires a two-thirds majority of each Order at two successive sessions of the General Synod as well as consent of all the Provincial Synods. (Declaration of Principles ss. 11(a)(ii-iii)). Beyond that, the dioceses should also be consulted, particularly in light of the limitations on the exercise of their authority implicit in the adoption of the Covenant. Although there is no mechanism for the dioceses to signify their assent, the Rules of Order do provide for a vote by dioceses (Rule 20). Ideally, every Diocesan Synod should be requested to debate the Covenant and to signify their intention to be bound by it. No Province should give its consent without the consent of the dioceses, even though this is not constitutionally required. Nevertheless, if adoption of the Covenant is tantamount to a constitutional change for the General Synod, the same is true for the Provinces and dioceses.

6. If General Synod were to adopt the Covenant, what steps would have to be taken to be able to fulfil the obligation under section 4.2.9 for there to be adequate mechanisms within the Canadian Church to ensure that all parts of the Canadian Church comply with the Covenant? What steps would need to be taken by General Synod, the Provincial Synods and the Diocesan Synods to put in place such a mechanism?

If the Covenant were included in the Declaration of Principles as suggested above, then any action contrary to the Covenant by any Synod would be ultra vires. What would be required would be some kind of constitutional mechanism to nullify any action by a Synod. One way to accomplish this would be to give authority of nullification to either the General Synod or the Council of General Synod with respect to Provincial and Diocesan Synods, and perhaps to the Supreme Court with respect to the General Synod, unless the declaration of incompatibility by the Standing Committee is understood itself to nullify any action in question.

The General Secretary could act as the Covenant Compliance and Liaison officer.

The difficulty in specifying mechanisms to ensure compliance is that it is impossible to know in advance exactly what actions might be incompatible with the Covenant and hence what would constitute compliance. Any compliance mechanism would have to be reactive, taking action only when the Standing Committee has declared an action by a Canadian synod to be incompatible with the Covenant.

But beyond synodical action, it is possible to contemplate that an action by a bishop might be declared incompatible with the Covenant, and thus also ultra vires. For example, a bishop's decision to ordain a candidate could be overturned by the Standing Committee in response to a question. Or even the election and consecration of a bishop could be nullified. The implications of such a ruling are obviously serious, especially if it were to occur well after the fact. There is nothing in the Covenant that prevents it from being used retroactively. In such a case it is difficult to imagine how compliance could be ensured. In fact, ensuring compliance could conceivably prove so onerous a task that the General Synod might seriously consider withdrawing from the Covenant.

7. Is the strong synodical place of the laity in the Canadian Church sufficiently upheld in the decision-making processes in the Covenant?

Since 1857 the clergy and laity of the Anglican Church of Canada have had authority to meet in Synod to determine the doctrine, discipline and policies of the Church. The same question could be asked with respect to the place of the lower clergy in Canadian synods. The chief decision-making authority in the Covenant process is centred on the Standing Committee, of which 50% is Primates and 50% representatives of the Anglican Consultative Council. The latter half would comprise bishops, clergy and laity, with no rules about the proportions of each. Where bishops are a small minority in Canadian Synods, and clergy and laity approximately equally represented, this proportion is not present in the Standing Committee. Thus the significant role played by both laity and lower clergy in Canadian synods is omitted in the mechanisms of the Covenant. Nor is there any youth representation in the Standing Committee. In practice, the preponderance of authority under the Covenant would be held by bishops and particularly by Primates.

8. Would there be a difference between General Synod’s passing a resolution to “adopt” the Covenant (the term used in the Covenant), “accede” to the Covenant (the term used by the Church in South-East Asia), or “subscribe” to the Covenant (the term used by the Church of Ireland)?

It is not clear what either the Church of Ireland or South-East Asia intended by choosing a verb other than “adopt” in relation to the Covenant. The Covenant does not contemplate any verb other than “adopt.” What is clear from the Church of Ireland's debate is that, whatever they intended by choosing “subscribe”, they understood the term to mean something different than “adopt”. Thus it would appear that the Church of Ireland explicitly chose not to adopt the Covenant. Although the precise difference would depend on the verb chosen, there would be a difference in not using the verb “adopt.”

In my view there is no value in the Anglican Church of Canada choosing to employ a verb not contemplated by the Covenant. Either the General Synod will intend to adopt the Covenant or it will not. In either case, the action taken by the General Synod should be unambiguous, and not subject to debate or interpretation.

9. What would be the effect of a decision by General Synod not to adopt the Covenant?

Under the Covenant, the only effect of a decision by the General Synod not to adopt it would be that the Anglican Church of Canada would not be bound by the Covenant and would be ineligible to participate in the dispute-settling procedures in section 4.2, or to propose amendments to the Covenant (section 4.4.2). Some commentators have suggested that failure to adopt the Covenant would be tantamount to withdrawing from the Anglican Communion. But the Covenant neither states this, nor defines membership in the Anglican Communion.

Whether there would be any other consequences to a decision not to adopt the Covenant is impossible to predict. Any further consequences would not be “relational consequences” within the meaning of the term in the Covenant.

10. Are there any other legal or constitutional implications or consequences which have not been identified by the GWG which would be raised by adopting the Covenant?

The GWG report is both thorough and comprehensive. That said there is one question that has not been touched on: if the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada were to adopt the Covenant, would the Standing Committee and the dispute-settling mechanism of section 4.2 supersede the authority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, described in Canon XX as “final”?

The GWG is to be commended for their excellent work.

Canadian Legal Analysis

The Governance Working Group of the Anglican Church of Canada has released its report on the legal and constitutional implications of the proposed Anglican Covenant, as requested by the General Synod. In addition to the report, there is also an executive summary.

The report analyses the proposed Covenant under four headings:

Definitional Concerns lists no fewer than nine key terms in the proposed Covenant that are left undefined. This is a concern because, as the report states, “the Covenant is more than a statement of belief or intention; it is a legal document.” Exactly. And as a legal document it requires clarity of definition. For without clarity, the report says, it is “difficult to know the full nature and extent of the obligations which would be undertaken by adopting the Covenant.” That being the case, it is difficult to understand how any Synod can responsibly vote to adopt the Covenant.

Under the rubric of Procedural Concerns, the report discusses seven difficulties with the dispute-settling process in the proposed Covenant. For example, the report raises concerns about the vagueness of the process in section 4.2. (See my comments in this vein here.) It also notes that the process fails to guarantee the principles of Natural Justice. I have also analysed this issue in two parts here and here. Furthermore, there is no right or mechanism to appeal a decision of the Standing Committee.

The report also considers Constitutional Concerns for the Canadian Church. These include issues such as the assumption in the proposed Covenant that all Churches are unitary bodies, but the Canadian Church is not. It is thus not obvious how the obligations of the Covenant would be enforced in Canada, assuming we could accurately determine what those obligations are. (For non-Canadians, I suggest you read this section anyway and then ask whether the concerns apply to your own Church.)

Finally, the report discusses Consequences of Not Adopting the Covenant. Actually, aside from not being able to participate in the dispute-settling procedures and being exempt from those procedures, there don't seem to be any significant consequences. A point worth pondering.

The report also solicits feedback on a series of ten questions. I suggest that, having carefully read the report, those questions provide an indispensable framework for the study of the proposed Covenant. In my view, they should be asked by every member of every Synod prior to voting on a resolution to adopt the Covenant.

The report provides a thorough analysis of the legal and constitutional implications of adopting or not adopting the proposed Covenant. Although it is written from the Canadian perspective, I suggest that it would nevertheless be a valuable resource for Anglicans around the world.

General Synod also requested a theological analysis of the proposed Covenant. I look forward to it eagerly. The legal analysis has established a very high standard.

Canadian Study Guide

The Anglican Church of Canada has launched a study guide for the proposed Anglican Covenant, supported by a website with a variety of links to resources.

Designed for use in a variety of contexts, the Canadian study guide encourages an in-depth discussion in three sessions. The guide itself invites participants to consider both advantages and disadvantages, ways in which the proposed Covenant might enhance or impede the mission of each Church and the Communion. To the credit of the authors, this study guide does not seem to be designed to steer the discussion to a pre-determined outcome, such as adoption of the proposed Covenant.

The supporting web site includes links to a variety of resources, both pro and con, including even the No Anglican Covenant Coalition web site. My only question about the web resources is that the NACC web site is clearly identified as coming from a group opposed to the Covenant (just in case anyone couldn't deduce that from the name), but the Anglican Communion Institute, which is also linked, is not described. An unsuspecting user of the Canadian resource list might not realize that the ACI is not an official organ of the Anglican Communion or indeed of anything. Which is not to say that their comments should not be linked. The comprehensiveness of the links is a strength.

Another question for me has to do with the commentary on the proposed Covenant, which accompanies the study guide. The commentary on sections 1-3 of the Covenant inexplicably stops after Section 1. Is it that the authors of the study guide had nothing to comment on with respect to Sections 2 and 3? Is this an oversight? Or were they waiting for further materials to be released?

On the matter of other materials, there is still the promise of analyses of the proposed Covenant from theological and legal perspectives. We await the release of those two documents from the Faith, Worship and Ministry Committee, and from the Governance Working Group. If the study guide is any indication, the analyses are likely to be very helpful. I suspect that once those are in place there will be a good and very comprehensive package of resources for a serious study of the proposed Covenant, which should be of use well beyond the borders of Canada.

But the release of the study guide in advance of these other two documents is unfortunate timing. It would have been better to wait and put them all out together, as any study without a full set of resources, and especially without the detailed analysis of the proposed Covenant that was requested by the General Synod, will be both incomplete and premature.

I hope that anyone interested in conducting a study of the proposed Covenant will wait for the rest of the materials. Once they are released, then let it be studied in detail.

Not Punitive?

Part of the narrative pushing the proposed Anglican Covenant toward adoption is the assertion that relational consequences are not punitive in nature. They are, the narrative says, simply the natural outcome of actions taken by a Church that others suggest may be incompatible with the Covenant. So, if a Church insists on exercising the autonomy supposedly guaranteed by the Covenant in a manner which is rash or inappropriate or irresponsible, then certain consequences ensue and that's life. It's your fault that you got wet because you went out in the rain without an umbrella. Tough.

But, I respond, if these consequences are natural then they are presumably predictable. And if they are natural, then they hardly need to be recommended or implemented, do they? They will just happen. When you go out in the rain sans umbrella, no-one has to recommend that you get wet. And the implementation requires no human intervention. So why the need for soliciting advice, and issuing recommendations?

Besides, continues the narrative, these are after all only recommendations. Whether consequences ensue or not will depend on whether the recommendations are accepted by whomever they are issued to. It is, after all, up to each Church or Instrument of Communion to decide whether or not to accept the recommendations. (See section 4.2.7)

Yes, but. Section 3.2.1 commits signatory Churches to support the Instruments of Communion “and to endeavour to accommodate their recommendations.” And given that the Standing Committee acts for two Instruments (the Anglican Consultative Council and the Primates' Meeting) and includes a third (the Archbishop of Canterbury) it seems that failure to “accommodate [its] recommendations” would in itself be incompatible with the Covenant. And although the Instruments of Communion themselves are not signatories, and thus not bound by the proposed Covenant, it would be very difficult to imagine the Anglican Consultative Council, or the Primates' Meeting or the Archbishop of Canterbury rejecting recommendations from the Standing Committee, given that its membership consists wholly of people from those three Instruments, and the process of determining recommendations involves input from the first two. (Section 4.2.4)

Anyway, says the narrative, the relational consequences would already exist. It's not like the Standing Committee would be recommending something that's not already in place.

Really? It's true that there might be a state of impaired communion between two Churches or perhaps two groups of Churches before the dispute giving rise to that state reaches the Standing Committee. But that's not the only possible relational consequence. And up to that point it would be unilateral. So, yes, I suppose we could see the Standing Committee giving sanction to a unilateral declaration of impaired communion. And would that “recommendation” apply only to the Church which has made the declaration, or would it also be made to the other Churches of the Communion, in order to isolate the “offending” Church? And what of relational consequences that involve a limitation of or suspension from participation in an Instrument of Communion? Obviously that state of affairs would not exist before the recommendation is made.

Finally, says the narrative, relational consequences are just that. They're not a punishment, just the outcome of a simple nexus of cause and effect.

How genteel. And a penitentiary is nothing more than a place where people go to consider the naughtiness of their ways and repent thereof. A place of penitence.

No matter how you slice it, relational consequences are coercive in nature. Look at section 4.2.5:

The Standing Committee may request a Church to defer a controversial action. If a Church declines to defer such action, the Standing Committee may recommend to any Instrument of Communion relational consequences which may specify a provisional limitation of participation in, or suspension from, that Instrument until the completion of the process set out below.

In other words, stop what you're doing until we make a decision or else. It may not be punishment in the sense of retribution, but it does fit the definition of punishment as “a caution against further transgression.” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) The purpose of the recommendation of relational consequences is to influence behaviour. It is the use of coercive power. And whether that power is used provisionally during the investigative phase of the dispute settling process, or at the outcome of the process doesn't make any difference. Relational consequences are just a rose by another name. And they smell as sweet.

Recommendations of relational consequences aren't punitive? Somewhere I think I've heard that line before....

'Do you know where you are, Winston?' [O'Brien] said.

'I don't know. I can guess. In the Ministry of Love.'

...

'And why do you imagine that we bring people to this place?'

'To make them confess.'

'No, that is not the reason. Try again.'

'To punish them.'

'No!' exclaimed O'Brien. His voice had changed extraordinarily, and his face had suddenly become both stern and animated. 'No! Not merely to extract your confession, not to punish you. Shall I tell you why we have brought you here? To cure you! To make you sane!'

Ah.

What goes on in the Emerald Isle?

It has been reported that the Church of Ireland has “subscribed” to the Anglican Covenant.

But what does that mean?

Evidently, a great deal was made in the debate of the difference in Irish polity between the impact of subscribing to the Covenant rather than adopting it. Trouble is, there is no mechanism in the Covenant to subscribe to it. According to section 4.1, a church can “adopt” the Covenant. And specifically according to section 4.1.6, the “Covenant becomes active for a Church when that Church adopts the Covenant.” No mention of subscribing.

And section 4.2.8 states that:

Participation in the decision making of the Standing Committee or of the Instruments of Communion in respect to section 4.2 shall be limited to those members of the Instruments of Communion who are representatives of those churches who have adopted the Covenant, or who are still in the process of adoption.

So, whatever the Church of Ireland thought it was doing by subscribing to the Covenant, it appears that it has not adopted it, and thus it is not “active” for the Church of Ireland. Nor can the representatives of the Church of Ireland participate in the dispute settling processes of section 4.2.

Question: is the Emerald City in the Emerald Isle?

I don't think we're in Kansas anymore.

Ceding Jurisdiction

In my recent test-drive of the proposed Anglican Covenant, I explored what might happen if a specific resolution of the Canadian General Synod were to be challenged under the terms of the Covenant. The resolution, A186, adopted in 2007 reads:

That this General Synod resolves that the blessing of same-sex unions is not in conflict with the core doctrine (in the sense of being creedal) of The Anglican Church of Canada.

I suggested that this resolution constitutes the General Synod's definition of doctrine on the question of same-sex blessings pursuant to its jurisdiction over the definition of doctrine under its Declaration of Principles, section 6(i).

The Declaration of Principles is part of the constitutional framework of the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada. (The other parts are the Constitution and the Rules of Order and Procedure). Among other things, it sets out the areas of jurisdiction held by the General Synod and the Synods of the four internal Provinces in Canada. (Canada, Rupert's Land, Ontario and British Columbia and Yukon. Yes, “Canada” is also the name of an internal Province. We like to get good mileage out of names.)

In my test-drive, I suggested that if the Standing Committee were to declare Resolution A186 incompatible with the Covenant, that would create a constitutional crisis for Canada:

If we've got this far the General Synod will have adopted the Covenant, and the Covenant states repeatedly (e.g., sections 3.2.2, 4.1.3) that it respects the constitutional autonomy of the signatory Churches. So now you have two processes, both recognized by the General Synod, which have come to opposite conclusions on the same issue. How is the General Synod to resolve the matter? Either it will have to revisit Resolution A186 and rescind it, or live with whatever “relational consequences” befall it - or withdraw from the Covenant, pursuant to section 4.3.1 and live with whatever consequences that would trigger. And as for the Covenant's assurance of respect for constitutional autonomy, it's empty. Because true respect for the constitutional autonomy of the Anglican Church of Canada would mean that the Standing Committee would have to decline to rule on any question about Resolution A186, or any constitutionally similar resolution.

Simply accepting whatever relational consequences ensue and carrying on is really not an option, if that includes being suspended from participation in the Instruments of Communion or otherwise breaking communion. For one thing, section 1 of the Declaration of Principles, also known as the Solemn Declaration, states that “We declare this Church to be, and desire that it shall continue, in full communion with the Church of England throughout the world....” (The language is from 1893 and may not be altered.) And that declaration is not merely the sentiment of our Victorian forebears, it also reflects the ongoing commitment of the Canadian Church to be an active member of the Anglican Communion. So there would be little choice but to revisit the resolution.

In effect, then, the freedom to exercise its power to define doctrine would be denied the General Synod by its participation in the Covenant. This would constitute a de facto ceding of that jurisdiction to the Standing Committee, for the Standing Committee would hold effective veto power.

The imposition of relational consequences would also have other constitutional implications for Canada. Section 6(d) gives the General Synod jurisdiction over “the relations of the [Anglican] Church [of Canada] to other Churches of the Anglican Communion.” If the relational consequences were sufficiently severe as to constitute shunning of the Anglican Church of Canada, there might be no way for the General Synod to exercise that power.

Not every power of the General Synod would realistically be at risk under the proposed Covenant. For example, it's hard to imagine anyone raising a question concerning the General Synod's exercise of its jurisdiction over “the establishment, operation and maintenance of a general pension fund.” (Section 6(m)). But in addition to definition of doctrine, it is not inconceivable that questions from other Churches could at some point be raised concerning issues such as the contents of the Canadian Book of Common Prayer (Section 6(j)) or the “qualifications ... of candidates for the ministry of the Church.” (Section 6(l)) (Here I have in mind particularly moral qualifications for clergy, such as marital status, and even sexual orientation or gender.) And there is nothing in the proposed Covenant that limits such questions to future actions. Indeed, its whole purpose is to address actions that have already been taken.

The proposed Covenant tries to reassure us that “[n]othing in this Covenant of itself shall be deemed to alter any provision of the Constitution and Canons of any Church of the Communion, or to limit its autonomy of governance.” And furthermore that “[t]he Covenant does not grant to any one Church or agency of the Communion control or direction over any Church of the Anglican Communion.” (Section 4.1.3) It also commits signatories “to respect the constitutional autonomy of all of the Churches of the Anglican Communion.” (Section 3.2.2) But these assurances are empty if the Standing Committee has effective veto power over decisions and actions of a Church. (See also my previous comments on this point.)

And even if, as suggested by Chancellor Ron Stevenson, a Church in adopting the Covenant were to include a clause in its Act of Synod to the effect that the adoption of the Covenant does not imply any constitutional change or limitation of jurisdiction, the whole point of the proposed Covenant is to restrain the exercise of autonomy.

I have written specifically from the perspective of the Anglican Church of Canada, because that's the constitution I know best, but I suggest that the same issue applies to all churches of the Anglican Communion. And being a Church of a different status won't make any difference. Whether established, disestablished, quasi-established or unestablished, adoption of the proposed Covenant will have constitutional implications for any Church that takes that step.

Adopting the proposed Covenant, in effect, would imply ceding jurisdiction.

Mostly Harmless

I have had a number of conversations with well-informed, thoughtful Anglicans, many of them in leadership positions such as Synod members and bishops and ecclesiastical lawyers, which convince me that a large number of people have essentially adopted a narrative about the proposed Anglican Covenant, a narrative which seems to be relatively uninfluenced by anything like reading the document. Their comments typically go like this:

I don't actually believe that the Covenant will accomplish what it is supposed to do. It won't really address the tensions in the Anglican Communion. But I don't believe that it is the Abomination of Desolation, either. I don't think it's going to have any ill effect. Recommendations of Relational Consequences are nothing to worry about.

This reminds me of the succinct description of the Earth and its inhabitants in the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: “Mostly harmless.” Not to mention feckless.

I'm not sure about that assessment, but let's assume it for a minute. What amazes me is the conclusion reached based on it:

Since it's mostly harmless, even if it's also not likely to produce any positive effects, I will vote to support it because by doing so we can show our commitment to the Anglican Communion and our loyalty to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Now, I am committed to the Anglican Communion, and loyal to the Archbishop of Canterbury, but I don't grasp how this conclusion follows from the assumption that the proposed Covenant is both harmless and feckless.

First, the tensions in the Anglican Communion are well known and beyond dispute. And they certainly need to be addressed creatively. If we don't believe that the proposed Covenant is the vehicle to do so, then why support it? Especially, why continue to support the narrative that the proposed Covenant will help us to strengthen the Communion if we don't actually believe the narrative? It would be like the World Health Organization going round injecting people with some inert substance like saline solution during a flu pandemic in the hope that the placebo effect will stop the spread of flu, or at least that they will give a convincing impression of doing something. It's no good pretending that something we believe won't help will be of any use to us. That's not a very effective way of demonstrating commitment to the Anglican Communion, let alone actually doing something constructive about the aforementioned tensions.

And as to demonstrating loyalty to the Archbishop of Canterbury, surely supporting a proposed Covenant which we believe will eventually just sit harmlessly on a shelf gathering dust is equally ineffective. Do we participate in a charade simply to avoid hurting the Archbishop's feelings, or to cheer him up by giving him something in the win column? Is that not to play the role of the royal advisers, praising the Emperor's new clothes to his face whilst trying to avoid sniggering behind his naked back? In what way is that loyal to the Archbishop?

All that assumes that the assessment that the proposed Covenant is harmless is correct. But I don't believe that to be the case. Regular readers of this blog, if any, will know that I have some grave concerns about every section of the proposed Covenant, not least section 4.2, which sets out the mechanism for addressing disagreements in the Anglican Communion. The lack of definition of what constitutes a matter of concern, the ambiguity in the definition of the parameters of faith and practice in authentic Anglicanism, the unclear, arbitrary and unjust process by which questions will be decided, all give every reason to worry that the process will be anything but harmless. And when relational consequences are imposed (yes, “imposed”; not merely “recommended”, for recommendations will be expected to be implemented) following a vague and arbitrary process, there may be real harm to the Anglican Communion and possibly to its churches.

What kind of harm to its churches, you ask? For an example, consider a lawsuit which is still before the courts in Canada. Some Anglicans who left the Diocese of New Westminster sued the diocese in an attempt to gain ownership of the church properties and other assets that they were trying to take with them. They lost in the lower court and again on appeal. They are currently applying to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Part of their argument was that they, the dissenters, and not the Diocese of New Westminster, were the true Anglicans, and thus that they were entitled to keep the properties. The court found that the Diocese of New Westminster was in fact the true representative of the Anglican Communion in Vancouver. As evidence, the court cited the fact that Bishop of New Westminster had been invited to the Lambeth Conference (whilst the dissenters' “bishop” had not) and other points. But what if the Anglican Church of Canada had been subject to relational consequences pursuant to the proposed Covenant? What if we had been suspended from participation in the Lambeth Conference and the other Instruments of Communion? Although it might not have been fatal to the defence of the lawsuit, such a state of affairs certainly would have introduced an element of risk on the point of who, if anyone, were the authentic Anglicans. And that kind of risk we could do without. And even if you don't think your own church is ever likely to be engaged in such lawsuits, why inflict that risk on others? Isn't the Covenant process supposed to be about taking other churches into consideration?

And even if the proposed Covenant cannot be definitively demonstrated to put churches at risk of losing lawsuits, what of the potential for being tied up in endless dispute-settling procedures on other areas of tension? For friction in the relationships in the Anglican Communion is not limited to sex, nor will the current tensions, if resolved, be the last we face. There is a significant number of possible areas of conflict waiting in the wings, such as lay presidency at the eucharist, admission of unconfirmed children to communion, admission of unbaptized persons to communion, differences in practice with respect to remarriage after divorce and the implications for clergy, interfaith dialogue, and ongoing differences with respect to the ordination of women, especially as bishops. What will happen when a woman is appointed as Archbishop of Canterbury, if some churches can't accept her authority as an Instrument of Communion? Could a question be raised as to whether the Church of England in making the appointment was not sufficiently cautious, or failed to obtain sufficient consensus? How harmless will the Covenant look then? Either it will have no effect, in which case the tensions remain and fester, or it will make things worse. Neither outcome is particularly attractive, to say the least.

I could be wrong. Maybe the proposed Covenant is as harmless as some people believe. But if it is, then it is also as feckless as that narrative suggests. In that case, rather than adopting a Covenant for purely symbolic reasons, wouldn't it be better to be honest and adopt a resolution affirming our commitment to the Anglican Communion and our loyalty to the Archbishop of Canterbury? And if I'm right, if the proposed Covenant is not harmless, is it responsible to sleepwalk into adopting it for all the wrong reasons, and then be stuck with the consequences?